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Banks in the interbank network can not assess the true risks associated with lending to other
banks in the network, unless they have full information on the riskiness of all the other banks.
These risks can be estimated by using network metrics (for example DebtRank) of the interbank
liability network which is available to Central Banks. With a simple agent based model we show that
by increasing transparency by making the DebtRank of individual nodes (banks) visible to all nodes,
and by imposing a simple incentive scheme, that reduces interbank borrowing from systemically risky
nodes, the systemic risk in the financial network can be drastically reduced. This incentive scheme
is an effective regulation mechanism, that does not reduce the efficiency of the financial network,
but fosters a more homogeneous distribution of risk within the system in a self-organized critical
way. We show that the reduction of systemic risk is to a large extent due to the massive reduction of
cascading failures in the transparent system. An implementation of this minimal regulation scheme
in real financial networks should be feasible from a technical point of view.
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Since the beginning of banking the possibility of a
lender to assess the riskiness of a potential borrower has
been essential. In a rational world, the result of this
assessment determines the terms of a lender-borrower re-
lationship (risk-premium), including the possibility that
no deal would be established in case the borrower appears
to be too risky. When a potential borrower is a node in a
lending-borrowing network, the node’s riskiness (or cred-
itworthiness) not only depends on its financial conditions,
but also on those who have lending-borrowing relations
with that node. The riskiness of these neighboring nodes
depends on the conditions of their neighbors, and so on.
In this way the concept of risk loses its local character
between a borrower and a lender, and becomes systemic.
The assessment of the riskiness of a node turns into
an assessment of the entire financial network [1]. Such
an exercise can only carried out with information on the
asset-liablilty network. This information is, up to now,
not available to individual nodes in that network. In
this sense, financial networks – the interbank market in
particular – are opaque. This intransparency makes it
impossible for individual banks to make rational decisions
on lending terms in a financial network, which leads to
a fundamental principle: Opacity in financial networks
rules out the possibility of rational risk assessment, and
consequently, transparency, i.e. access to system-wide
information is a necessary condition for any systemic risk
management.
The banking network is a fundamental building block
in our globalized society. It provides a substantial part
of the funding and liquidity for the real economy [2]. The
real economy – the ongoing process of invention, produc-
tion, distribution, use, and disposal of goods and ser-
vices – is inherently risky. This risk originates in the un-
certainty of payoffs from investments in business ideas,
which might not be profitable, or simply fail. This type
of risk can not be eliminated from an evolving economic
system, however it can be spread, shared, and diversified.
One of the roles of the financial system is to distribute
the risk generated by the real economy among the actors
in the financial network. The financial network can be
seen as a service to share the burden of economic risk. By
no means should this service by itself produce additional
systemic risk endogenously. Neither should the design
and regulation of financial networks introduce mecha-
nisms that leverage or inflate the intrinsic risk of the real
economy. As long as systemic risk is endogenously gener-
ated within the financial network, this system is not yet
properly designed and regulated. In this paper we show,
that unless a certain level of transparency is introduced
in financial networks, systemic risk will be endogenously
generated within the financial network. This systemic
risk is hard to reduce with traditional regulation schemes
[3, 4]. By introducing a minimum level of transparency
in financial networks, endogenous risk can be drastically
reduced without negative effects on the efficiency in the
financial services for the real economy.
In most developed countries interbank loans are
recorded in the ‘central credit register’ of Central Banks,
that reflects the asset-liability network of a country [5].
The capital structure of banks is available through stan-
dard reporting to Central Banks. Payment systems
record financial flows with a time resolution of one sec-
ond, see e.g. [6]. Several studies have been carried out on
historical data of asset-liability networks [7–12], includ-
ing overnight markets [13], and financial flows [14].
Given this data, it is possible (for Central Banks) to
compute network metrics of the asset-liability matrix in
real-time, which in combination with the capital struc-
ture of banks, allows to define a systemic risk-rating of
banks. A systemically risky bank in the following is a
bank that – should it default – will have a substantial
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FIG. 1. Schematic structure of the model: firms approach
their bank for firm-loans. These loans are transferred to the
households, where they are redistributed to other firms or
are deposited in banks. If a bank can not service a firm-loan
because it presently does not have the requested sum available
in the bank, it tries to get the necessary funding through an
interbank (IB) loan from an other bank. If it can get an IB
loan, the firm-loan is payed out, if it can not, the firm will
receive no loan.
impact (losses due to failed credits) on other nodes in the
network. The idea of network metrics is to systematically
capture the fact, that by borrowing from a systemically
risky bank, the borrower also becomes systemically more
risky since its default might tip the lender into default.
These metrics are inspired by PageRank, where a web
page, that is linked to a famous page, gets a share of the
‘fame’. A metric similar to PageRank, the so-called Deb-
tRank, has been recently used to capture systemic risk
levels in financial networks [15]. In this paper we present
an agent based model of the interbank network that al-
lows to estimate the extent to which systemic risk can
be reduced by introducing transparency on the level of
the DebtRank. For computational efficiency we propose
a measure based on Katz centrality [16], which we refer
to Katz rank. Both are closely related to the concept
of eigenvalue centrality [17]. Betweenness centrality has
been used to determine systemic financial risk before [9].
To demonstrate the risk-reduction potential of feeding in-
formation of the DebtRank back into the system, we use
a simple toy model of the financial- and real economy
which is described in the next section. Interbank models
of similar design were used before in different contexts
[18, 19].
The central idea of this paper is to operate the finan-
cial network in two modes. The first reflects the situation
today, where banks don’t know about the systemic im-
pact of other banks, and where all interbank (IB) credits
are traded with the same interest rate, the so-called ‘in-
ter bank offer rate’, rib. We call this scenario the normal
mode.
The second mode introduces a minimum regulation
scheme, where banks chose their IB trading partners
based on their DebtRank. The philosophy of this scheme
comes from the fact that borrowing from a systemically
dangerous node can make the borrower also dangerous,
since she inherits part of the risk, and thereby increases
overall systemic risk. Note, that a default of the borrower
from a systemically dangerous bank affects not only the
lender, but possibly also all other nodes from which the
lender has borrowed. The idea is to reduce systemic risk
in the IB network by not allowing borrowers to borrow
from risky nodes. In this way systemically risky nodes
are punished, and an incentive for nodes is established
to be low in systemic riskiness. Note, that lending to a
systemically dangerous node does not increase the sys-
temic riskiness of the lender. We implement this scheme
by making the DebtRank of all banks visible to those
banks that want to borrow. The borrower sees the Deb-
tRank of all its potential lenders, and is required (that
is the regulation part) to ask the lenders for IB loans
in the order of their inverse DebtRank. In other words,
it has to ask the least risky bank first, then the second
risky one, etc. In this way the most risky banks are
refrained from (profitable) lending opportunities, until
they reduce their liabilities over time, which makes them
less risky. Only then will they find lending possibilities
again. This mechanism has the effect of distributing risk
homogeneously through the network, and prevents the
emergence of systemically risky nodes in a self-organized
critical way: risky nodes reduce their credit risk because
they are blocked from lending, non-risky banks can be-
come more risky by lending more. We call this mode the
transparent mode.
3THE MODEL
The agents in the model are B banks, F = B firms and
households. For details of the implementation, see SI1.
At every timestep each firm approaches its main bank
with a request for a loan. The size of these loans is a
random number from a uniform distribution. Banks try
to provide the requested firm-loan. If they have enough
cash reserves available, the loan is granted. If they do not
have enough, they approach other banks in the interbank
(IB) market and try to get the amount from them at an
interest rate of rib. Not every bank has business relations
with every other bank. Interbank relations are recorded
in the IB relation network, A. If two banks i and j,
are wiling to borrow from each other, Aij = 1, if they
have no business relations, Aij = 0. We model the IB
relation network with random graphs and scale-free net-
works, see SI. If a bank does not have enough cash and
can not raise the full amount for the requested firm-loan
on the IB market, it does not pay out the loan. If the
bank does pay out a loan, the firm transfers some of the
cash to the households as ‘investments’ for future payoffs
(wages, invest in new machines, etc.). Loans from pre-
vious timesteps are paid back after τ timesteps with an
interest rate of rf−loan > rib. The fraction of the loan
not used to pay back outstanding loans, ends up at the
households (for details see SI).
Households use the money received from firms to (1)
deposit a certain fraction at the bank, for which they
get interest of rh, or (2) to consume goods produced by
other firms (details in SI). This money flows back to firms
(the firms’ profits) and is used by those to repay loans.
If firms run a surplus, they deposit it in their bank ac-
counts, receiving interest of rf−deposit. The two actions
of the households effectively lead to a re-distribution and
re-allocation of funds at every timestep. For simplicity
we model the households as a single (aggregated) agent
that receives cash from firms (through firm-loans) and
re-distributes it randomly in banks (household deposits),
and among other firms (consumption).
Specifically, at time t a bank-firm pair is chosen ran-
domly, and the following actions take place:
(i) banks and firms repay loans issued at time t− τ
(ii) firms realize profits or losses (consumption)
(iii) banks pay interest to households
(iv) firms request loans
(v) households re-distribute cash obtained from firms
1 http://www.complex-systems.meduniwien.ac.at/people
/sthurner/SI/DebtRank/katz rank SI 05.pdf
(vi) liquidity management of banks in the IB mar-
ket, including: IB re-payments, firm-loan requests,
defaulted firms, and re-distribution effects from
households
(vii) firms pay salaries and make investments
(viii) firms or banks default if equity- or liquidity prob-
lems arise
A new bank-firm pair is picked until all are updated (ran-
dom sequential update); then timestep t+ 1 follows.
During the simulation, firms and banks may be unable
to pay their debts and thus become insolvent. Firms
are declared bankrupt if they are either insolvent, or if
their equity capital falls below some negative threshold.
Banks are declared bankrupt if they are insolvent, or have
equity capital below zero. If a firm goes bankrupt the
bank writes off the respective outstanding loans as de-
faulted credits and realizes the losses. If the bank has
not enough equity capital to sustain these losses it goes
bankrupt as well. After the bankruptcy of a bank there
occurs a default-event for all its IB creditors. This may
trigger a cascade of bank defaults. For simplicity, there
is no recovery for IB loans. A cascade of bankruptcies
happens within one timestep. After the last bankruptcy
is taken care of, the simulation is stopped. We model a
closed system of banks, firms and households, meaning
that there are no in- or out-flows of cash from the model.
The normal mode
In the normal mode the model captures the current
market practice, where banks follow a simple strategy
to manage their liquidity. If a bank needs additional
liquidity (for providing a firm-loan request, or for its own
re-payments of IB loans) it contacts banks it is connected
with in the IB relation network A, and asks them for IB
loans. In the normal mode, bank i asks its neighbors j
(with j ∈ Ii = {j
′ | Aij′ = 1}) in random order. If bank j
can provide only a fraction of the requested IB loan, bank
i takes it, and continues to ask an other neighbor bank
from Ii (in random order) until the liquidity requirements
of i are satisfied.
The transparent IB mode
A simple modification to improve the stability of the
system is to avoid borrowing from banks with a large sys-
temic impact. For this a minimum level of transparency
of the IB market is necessary. For all banks we compute
systemic risk metrics based on the interbank liability net-
work Lij(t), and the equity of banks C
b
i (t), at timestep
t (details in SI). In particular we compute the DebtRank
Rdebti [15], and – for comparison – the Katz rank R
katz
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FIG. 2. Comparison of the normal mode (red), i.e. random selection of counterparty for IB loans, with the transparent IB
market (blue), where the order of counterparty selection is determined by the inverse DebtRank. The fast mode is shown in
green. (a) Distribution of total losses to banks L, (b) distribution of cascade sizes C of defaulting banks, and (c) distribution
of transaction volume in the IB market V. We performed 10,000 independent, identical simulations, each with 500 timesteps,
100 banks, and the simulation parameters given in SI Table I. A is a fully connected graph.
(see methods). The most risky bank has rank 1, the least
risky has rank B, see methods.
In contrast to the normal mode, before bank i asks its
neighbors for IB loans, it orders them (the banks con-
tained in set Ii) according to their inverse Debt- or Katz
rank. It then asks its neighboring banks in the order of
their inverse rank, i.e. it first asks the least risky, then
the next risky, etc. The rank is computed at the begin-
ning of each timestep. In this way the low-risk banks are
favored because the likelihood for obtaining (profitable)
IB deals is much higher for them than for risky banks,
which are at the end of the list and will practically never
be asked.
In reality this implies that the banks know the Deb-
tRank of each of their neighboring banks. This trans-
parency is not available in the present banking system.
Note however, that in many countries Central Banks have
all the necessary data to compute the DebtRank. A pos-
sible way to implement such an incentive scheme in real-
ity, is presented in the discussion.
Transparent IB market – fast mode
We implement a version of the transparent IB market,
where the DebtRank is computed after every transaction
that takes place in the IB market, instead of being com-
puted at the beginning of the day. This version we refer
to as the fast mode.
RESULTS
We simulate the above model with the parameters
given in SI, for 500 timesteps. Results are averages over
10,000 identical simulations. Fit parameters to the fol-
lowing distribution functions are collected in SI Table 2.
In Fig. 2 (a) we show the distribution of losses to
banks L for the the normal mode (red), where the se-
lection of counterparties for IB loans is random and the
transparent mode (blue), where banks sort their poten-
tial counterparties according to their inverse DebtRank,
and then approach the least risky neighbor first for the
IB loan. The fast mode is shown in green. The normal
mode shows a heavy tail in the loss distribution, which
completely disappears in the transparent and fast modes,
where there are no losses higher than 50 and 40 units, re-
spectively. Of course losses do not entirely disappear in
the transparent scheme, since the credit risk that firms
bring to the banking system can not be completely elim-
inated. The fast mode appears to be slightly safer than
the transparent mode. Fits to all curves are found in SI.
The distribution of cascade-sizes C of defaulting banks
is seen in Fig. 2 (b). Again the normal mode shows
a heavy tail, meaning that in a non-negligible number
of events, defaults of a single bank trigger a cascade of
liquidity and equity problems through the system. In
some cases up to 80 % of the banks collapse. In the
transparent mode the likelihood for contagion is greatly
reduced, and the maximum cascade size is limited by 40
banks in the transparent and about 30 in the fast mode.
In Fig. 2 (c) we show the transaction volume in the IB
market V of the three modes, normal (red), transparent
(blue) and fast (green). The transparent and fast modes
show a higher transaction volume indicating a more effi-
cient IB market, where liquidity from banks with excess
funds is more effectively channeled to those without. We
verified, that the ratio of requested- to provided firm-
loans, the efficiency E , yields E ∼ 1, irrespective of the
mode.
In Fig. 3 we show the normalized DebtRank for all
individual banks, for the normal (red), and the trans-
parent scheme (blue). Banks are rank ordered according
to their DebtRank so that the most risky bank is found
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FIG. 3. Normalized DebtRank, Rˆi for individual banks in
the normal (red) and the transparent mode (blue). Banks are
ordered according to their DebtRank, the most risky is to the
very left, the safest to the very right. The distribution is an
average over 1000 simulation runs with an ER network, and
shows the situation at timestep t = 100.
to the very left, the safest to the very right. It is clear
that the systemic risk impact in the transparent mode is
spread more evenly throughout the system, whereas in
the normal mode some banks appear to be much more
dangerous to the system.
In Fig. 4 we compare the losses L for DebtRank (red)
and Katz rank (blue). The performance of of the two def-
initions is hardly distinguishable. Also the other systemic
risk measures show no noticeable difference, for cascade
size C, and transaction volume distributions V , see SI.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of losses L, for the (a)
normal and (b) transparent mode, as computed with an
ER contact network (red) with γ = 0.115, and a scale-free
BA network (see SI) with the same average connectivity
(〈k〉 = 11.5). In both modes the SF network leads to a
slightly riskier situation. The situation for cascade sizes
and transaction volume is depicted in SI Fig. 2, where
we also show and discuss the effects of connectivity on
the three measures in SI Fig. 3.
Finally, we compute the distribution of the time to first
default Tfd, for the normal and the transparent modes.
Both distributions are practically Gaussian (kurtosis ∼
3.3, skewness ∼ 0.4) with mean and standard deviation
of T normalfd = 138.2 ± 33.8, and T
transp.
fd = 138.1 ± 33.7,
respectively. This is expected, since typically the first
default is triggered by a firm-default, which is (to first
order) independent of the situation in the IB market,
but only depends on the parameters describing the firms
(µi, σ
return, Cdefault) and households (σ, ρ), see SI.
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FIG. 4. Comparison of the performance of the DebtRank
(red) and the Katz rank (blue) for the losses, L. Both rank
definitions provide practically identical results. Same simula-
tion parameters as in previous figure.
METHODS
DebtRank
DebtRank is a recursive method suggested in [15] to
determine the systemic relevance of nodes in financial
networks. It is a number measuring the fraction of the
total economic value in the network that is potentially
affected by a node or a set of nodes. Let Lij denote the
IB liability network at a given moment (loans of bank j
to bank i), and Ci is the capital of bank i, see SI. If bank
i defaults and can not repay its loans, bank j loses the
loans Lij , see SI. If j has not enough capital available to
cover the loss, j also defaults. The impact of bank i on
bank j (in case of a default of i) is therefore defined as
Wij = min
[
1,
Lij
Cj
]
. (1)
Given the total outstanding loans of bank i, Li =
∑
j Lji,
its economic value is defined as vi = Li/
∑
j Lj . The
value of the impact of bank i on its neighbors is Ii =∑
j Wijvj . To take into account the impact of nodes at
distance two and higher, it has to be computed recur-
sively,
Ii =
∑
j
Wijvj + β
∑
j
WijIj, (2)
where β is a damping factor. If the networkWij contains
cycles the impact can exceed one. To avoid this problem
an alternative was suggested [15], where two state vari-
ables, hi(t) and si(t), are assigned to each node. hi is
a continuous variable between zero and one; si is a dis-
crete state variable for 3 possible states, undistressed,
distressed, and inactive, si ∈ {U,D, I}. The initial con-
ditions are hi(1) = Ψ , ∀i ∈ Sf ; hi(1) = 0 , ∀i 6∈ Sf , and
6si(1) = D , ∀i ∈ Sf ; si(1) = U , ∀i 6∈ Sf (parameter Ψ
quantifies the initial level of distress: Ψ ∈ [0, 1], with
Ψ = 1 meaning default). The dynamics of hi is then
specified by
hi(t) = min

1, hi(t− 1) + ∑
j|sj(t−1)=D
Wjihj(t− 1)

 .
(3)
The sum extends over these j, for which sj(t− 1) = D,
si(t) =


D if hi(t) > 0; si(t− 1) 6= I,
I if si(t− 1) = D,
si(t− 1) otherwise.
(4)
The DebtRank of set Sf (set of nodes in distress at time
1), is R =
∑
j hj(T )vj −
∑
j hj(1)vj , and measures the
distress in the system, excluding the initial distress. If
Sf is a single node, the DebtRank measures its systemic
impact on the network. The DebtRank of Sf containing
only the single node i is
Ri =
∑
j
hj(T )vj − hi(1)vi. (5)
The normalized DebtRank is Rˆi = Ri/
∑
iRi.
Katz rank
The Katz centrality can be used to capture the risk of
contagion in IB networks and is defined as
Ki = α
∑
j
LijKj + β, (6)
To ensure that the Katz centrality converges, we set
α = 1/κ1, where κ1 is the largest eigenvalue of Lij . The
overall multiplier β is not important, for convenience we
set β = 1. We define the Katz rank in the following way:
the most risky bank i, with the highest Katz centrality
gets Katz rank Rkatzi (t) = 1, the least risky bank j (low-
est Katz centrality) gets Rkatzj (t) = B. Note, that banks
that only borrow (in-links only) may cause contagion and
have non-zero Katz centrality. Banks that only provide
loans (out-links) have zero Katz centrality. Loan sizes,
neighbors and their neighbors, etc., are included in the
centrality.
Systemic Risk measures
For measures of systemic risk in the system, we use
the following three observables: (1) time to first default
as the timesteps of the simulation before the first default
of a bank occurs, T fd, (2) the size of the cascade, C as the
number of defaulting banks triggered by an initial bank
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FIG. 5. Distributions of losses L for the normal (a) and trans-
parent mode (b), for an ER (red) and a SF network (blue),
both with the same average connectivity 〈k〉 = 11.5.
default (1 ≤ C ≤ B), and (3) the total losses to banks
following a default or cascade at t0, L = −
∑B
i [Ci(t0) −
Ci(t0 − 1)].
Efficiency measures
To quantify the efficiency of the banking system we use
the ratio of the sum of requested loans by the firms to
the sum of loans actually payed out to firms, at a given
time t, averaged over time,
E(t) =
∑B
i=1 li(t)∑B
i=1 l
req
i (t)
. (7)
The efficiency of the system is then the time average E =
〈E(t)〉t, taken over the simulation. As another measure of
efficiency we use the transaction volume in the IB market
at a particular time t = T in a typical simulation run,
V(t) =
B∑
j=1
B∑
i=1
lji(T ) + lji(T − τ). (8)
The first term represents the new IB loans at timestep
T , the second the loans that are repaid. We set T = 100.
7DISCUSSION
We showed that the risk, endogenously created in a fi-
nancial network by the inability of banks to carry out cor-
rect risk-estimates of their counterparties, can be drasti-
cally reduced by introducing a minimum level of trans-
parency. Systemic risk is significantly reduced by intro-
ducing an incentive that makes borrowers more prone to
borrow from systemically safe lenders. This philosophy
was implemented by making a centrality measure such
as the DebtRank available to all nodes in the network at
each point in time. We could show that the efficiency of
the financial network with respect to the real economy
is not affected by the proposed regulation mechanism
(E ∼ 1 in all modes). This is possible since the regu-
lation only re-distributes risk in order to avoid the emer-
gence of risky agents that might threaten the system, and
does not reduce the trading volume on the IB network.
Risky nodes that are low in DebtRank, are barred from
the possibility of lending their excess reserves to others.
This deprives them from making profits on IB loans, but
also reduces their risk of being hit by defaulted credits.
They only receive payments and do not issue more risk,
meaning that over time they become less risky. Less risky
banks are allowed to take more risk (lend more) and make
more profits. The proposed mechanism makes the system
safer in a self-organized critical manner.
Note, that in our scheme the borrower determines who
borrows from whom. Usually the lender is concerned if
the borrower will be able to repay the loan. However,
this risk of credit default is not necessarily of systemic
relevance. Lending to a bank with a large systemic risk
can have relatively little consequences for the systemic
importance for the lender, or the systemic risk of the
system as a whole. In contrast, if a bank borrows from a
systemically dangerous node the borrower inherits part of
this risk, and increases the overall systemic risk. These
facts are conveniently incorporated in the definition of
Debt- and Katz rank.
We found that the performance of the method is sur-
prisingly insensitive to the choice of the particular cen-
trality measure, or whether the actual topology of the IB
network (scale-free or random). Also the average con-
nectivity k¯ of the network is not relevant, as long as it
remains in sensible regions (〈k〉 ∈ [∼ 5, B]). This sug-
gests that the essence of the proposed scheme is that risk
is spread more evenly across the network, which practi-
cally eliminates cascading failures.
A possible way to implement the proposed trans-
parency in reality would be that Central Banks regu-
larly compute the DebtRank and make it available to
all banks. To enforce the regulation, the CB monitors
the IB loans in their central credit register, and severely
punishes borrowers who failed to find less risky lenders.
To design a more market based mechanism to obtain the
same self-organized critical regulation dynamics is sub-
ject to further investigations.
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